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ARGUMENT 
L THIS COURT SHOULD STRIKE ALL OR PORTIONS OF APPELLEE'S 
RESPONSIVE BRIEF FOR FAILING TO COMPLY WITH THE UTAH 
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
This Court should strike all or portions of Appellee's responsive brief for failing to 
comply with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
At this stage in the litigation the Appellee is representing himself Pro Se. Former 
counsel, Don Bybee, is under an order of suspension from the practice of law. Although the 
brief was delivered to counsel in an envelope with a return address from Mr. Bybee it 
purports to be filed Pro Se by the appellee. Notwithstanding appellee's lay status Pro Se 
litigants are presumed to know the rules and are held to the same standards as are licensed 
attorneys. Heathman v. Hatch, 13 Utah 2d 266,268,372 P.2d 990,991 (1962); Mankav. 
Martin, 200 Colo. 260, 614 P.2d 875, 880 (1980) (en banc), cert. Denied, 450 U.S. 913 
(1981); Johnson v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., Wyo., 630 P. 2d 514,517, cert. Denied, 454 
U.S. 1118 (1981), Smithy. Rabb, 95 Ariz49, 53, 386 P.2d 649, 652 (1963). 
Rule 24(e) makes it mandatory for a party to provide citations to the record for those 
factual legal matters which they advance and argue in their brief. The Supreme Court has 
stated that it need not and will not consider any facts not properly cited to or supported by 
the record. Uckerman v. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co.. 588 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978). Further, 
briefs which put forth legal argument which is not properly documented are also disregarded 
by the court. Koulis v. Standard Oil Co.. 746 P.2d 1182 (Utah App. 1987). In the present 
case, the Appellee makes a disingenuous and ambiguous general reference to the Trial 
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Transcript in his statement of facts. However, the facts put forth and the citations thereto 
do not comport with the record. 
The following are examples of factual inaccuracies or conclusory statements 
contained in Appellee's Statement of Facts: 
Fact 3: Appellee stated: The parties were married June 14, 1985 and no children 
were born of the marriage. The divorce was finally granted May 8, 1998 although 
Defendant was locked out of the home before, initiated divorce proceedings but was 
not able to proceed due to disabling depression. 
Comment: There is citation to or no support in the record for the conclusory 
statement that Defendant had disabling depression or that he was locked out of the 
home. This misstatement of fact is irrelevant to appeal, could be considered as 
scandalous information and should be stricken as inaccurate, unsupported, and 
irrelevant. 
Fact 6: Appellee stated: Delores was also employed at the Postal Service and 
made wages equal to or great than Victor (TT117-121) She retired due to election at 
the same time Victor did. 
Comment: This fact accurately states that Delores was employed as a Postal Service 
worker but inaccurately states that she earned wages which were equal to or greater 
than those earned by Defendant. The citation to the record supplied in support 
thereof does not contain any information concerning the amount of income earned by 
Delores or how that compared with the income of Mr. Shade^Havateyer, the record 
does reflect that in 1996 Mr. Shade earned $42,476.62 (TT. 107) and Delores earned 
$40,261.77 (TT. 50). Appellee's statement of fact is inaccurate and tends to mislead 
this Court and should be stricken as inaccurate and unsupported. 
Fact 7: Appellee stated: Delores admitted $977.00 per month retirement 
(TT.135) and with her other investments the Court found she had $1,460.00 per 
month income. With his paying off her debts of $4,902.46 her expenses were reduced 
by $395.00 per month leaving her discretionary money. 
Comment: Except for Delores retirement income of $977 the statements contained 
in this representation of fact are simply not supported by citations to the record. 
Fact 8: Appellee stated: Victor admitted $1,672 civil service retirement and an 
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application for $100 s z clal security makes it necessary for him to find part: time 
employment which he has not found in more than 15 months, (Findings #15) Not 
available to 2000. 
iomi: , ... I Ms representation of facts is not nuppnrtol h\ mi) citation I ll, , 
record. 
Fact y. Delores could work but refuses to do so but Victor is 
willing ..•»* i c o n i c (R 86-87") 
Comment: The fact that Delores could work is unsupported by any citation to the 
record. Appellee's citation to the record reflects a portion of his testimony about his 
ability to work and efforts to find work. The references to Delores ability to work 
should be stricken. 
£act lb. Appellee stated: Delores stated she let nt* >n^ iwo husbands off on 
alimony but the next one was going to pay (R 171 15). 
Comment: :icrs only to statements of counsel, was objected to and is not 
evidence before the 'I rail Court. Rather, 'this was an irrelevant and unsupported 
statement made by counsel during the trial to attempt to cast Delores in a negative 
light. It should be stricken as unsupported by citation to evidence in the record which 
was received, by the Trial Court. 
Fact 12: . Appellee stated: Delores brought a home into the
 marriage worth 
$115,000 at marriage and $140,000 at trial with $78,000 mortgage (TT 3-4) which 
was awarded to her and he delivered a deed but she refuses to remove him from the 
mortgage or a deed to his St. George property now worth less than then stipulated 
$60,000. 
Comment: I lie citation to the record correctly reflects the stipulated value of 
140,000 on Delores home at the time of trial and the balance of the mortgage of 
78,000. The remaining of the statements are unsupported by citation to the record 
and are improper and should be stricken. 
Fact 13: Appellee stated: Victor contributed $20,000 (equity from a prior 
marriage) (for refinancing) to pay down the mortgage. Later he paid $ 1,000.00 to put 
a down payment on the St. George property to fee title to lA acre so she could sell it 
and keep the $14,000 and got $10,000 home improvement contract both awarded to 
her. He also constructed a business building she got worth $10,000 (TT p43 1 20 TT 
p 47 I , 8). 
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Comment: The statements that Victor contributed 20,000 to the refinance of 
Delores home and 1,000 as a down payment on the St. George property are properly 
cited to the record all other statements are not supported by any citation to the record. 
The statement that she got a building worth $10,000 is directly contradictory of the 
finding of the Court (see TT205) and is misleading. These factual statements should 
be stricken. 
Fact 14: Appellee stated: The Court stated its determination not to rearrange the 
unique history of accounting (TT 205-206) he further stated "I am not going to award 
fees because I don't find him the ability to pay after I stick him with all of the debt" 
(TT p207 LI & 2) 
Comment: Appellee has failed to properly cite to the record. This fact should be 
stricken. 
Fact 16: Appellee stated: Victor had a business which showed no profit and in 
fact cost $11,000 which business went to her son (TT 37) which was sold for $9,000 
but which never got paid, in full. 
Comment: This fact is not properly cited to the record and should be stricken. 
Fact 17: Appellee stated: Delores said Victor offered in negotiations to pay 
$35,000 which she refused and the Court did not admit that in evidence and she never 
saw the money, and he did not have it. 
Comment: This fact is not properly cited to the record and should be stricken. 
In short, Appellee's brief does fall far short of the requkemeqj^ofj&le 24(e) and as 
such the entire brief or at least the non complying portions should be stricken 
H. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD DELORES HER 
PREMARITAL EQUITY IN THE REAL PROPERTY TOGETHER WITH 
THE APPRECIATION THEREOF. 
The trial court committed reversible error in failing to award Delores her 
premarital equity in the real property together with the appreciation thereof. The trial court 
misapplied the law resulting in a substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly 
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preponderates against the findings, and a serious inequity has resulted such as to manifest 
a clear abuse of discretion. 
It is the rule of law in this state that premarital property, together with the appreciation 
thereof, should normally be awarded to the party who brought that property into the 
marriage. Burke v. Burke. 733 P.2d 133,135 (Utah 1987). While there are exceptions, such 
as where one of the spouses has contributed to the assets maintenance or enhancement of 
value, none of the exceptions to the above stated rule apply in this case. 
The Court's ruling was not in accordance with the clear weight of the evidence which 
was before it and therefore a substantial and prejudicial error occurred. The Court 
misapphed foe tew by completely disiegaidfog \>etares>'s premarital interest in foe 
Taylorsville house and made no effort to return this to her with the appreciation thereof 
before dividing the portion of the equity which was a part of the marital estate. The fact that 
she had premarital equity was uncontroverted. The Trial Court did was award her the 
residence together with the increased debt thereon (which had been incurred to purchase the 
St. George property) and awarded to Victor the St. George property free and clear of any 
encumbrance. The net result was that he received all of the equity built up during the 
marriage and she received none. The ruling is so obviously inequitable that it manifests a 
clear abuse of discretion. As such, the trial court committed reversMe error and mis Court 
should reverse and remand with instructions on how to divide the marital and pre-marital 
equity. 
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III. THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT A FORMULA APPROACH TO THE 
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PRE-MARITAL AND ASSETS. 
In cases where issues of pre-marital equity and marital equity exist, this Court should 
adopt a formula approach to the equitable distribution of marital and pre-marital assets. 
Judge Michael D. Lyon of the Second Judicial District Court wrote an article in the Utah Bar 
Journal, entitled "The Source of Funds Rule-Equitably Classifying Separate and Marital 
Property" which sets forth a formula approach to the division of both marital and nonmarital 
assets based on the treatise by Brett R. Turner, entitled "Equitable Distribution of Property." 
Judge Lyon's article sets forth an easily followed explanation of this theory. A copy of the 
article is attached in the appendix to this brief. Delores urges this Court to adopt the formula 
set forth in the Source of Funds Rule as a method of standardizing the equitable distribution 
of separate and mixed property in this state. Doing so will provide a greater degree of 
certainty for domestic practitioners and the bench and more uniformly and equitably 
administer justice in domestic cases in this State. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO MAKE ADEQUATE 
FINDINGS ON THE ISSUE OF ALIMONY AND BY DENYING 
DELORES AN AWARD OF ALIMONY. 
The trial court erred by failing to make any findings on the issue of alimony. As such, 
this Court must remand this action for further findings. While the Court must consider the 
three factors of: 1) need, 2) ability of the recipient spouse to meet that need, and 3) ability 
of payor spouse to assist, the failure to make specific findings on these issues is reversible 
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error. 
The trial court failed to make findings on all of the material issues. Specifically, the 
finding as set forth above only genetically addresses the issues of need. It fails to find the 
reasonable expenses of Delores to establish a level of need. The Court also failed to make 
any finding as to Delores's ability to meet her level of need. Finally, and without any finding 
of supporting facts, the Court summarily concluded that Victor did not have the ability to 
pay. The record in this matter is replete with controverted evidence concerning Victor's 
reasonable expenses and his income which are both relevant to the issue of alimony. (TT. 
19; 63-77 ). The Court simply failed to make any finding as to what his income and expense 
was. The facts in the record are capable of supporting a finding in favor of an award of 
alimony. As such, the Court's findings are inadequate and constitute an abuse of discretion. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD DELORES 
ATTORNEY FEES IN THIS ACTION. 
For the same reasons set forth in Argument Section IV above, the trial court erred in 
failing to award Delores her attorney fees in this action. The evidence in the record is 
capable of demonstrating a need by Delores for fees, and the ability of Victor to pay them. 
However, when the Court made its ruling it failed to make any finding of fact and regarding 
fees and as such the ruling is inadequately supported and constitutes reversible error. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DIVIDE THE PARTIES 
RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS. 
The trial court erred in failing to divide the parties retirement accounts. It is axiomatic 
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that retirement accounts are marital property and that Civil Service retirement accounts are 
subject to division in a divorce proceeding. Jefferies v. Jefferies. 895 P.2d 835, 837-38 
(Utah App. 1995). Not only is it proper for the trial court to consider such assets, "it is 
required." Id 
In the present case the Court failed to divide the difference between Victor and 
Delores retirement accounts based on contributions made during the marriage or to make 
sufficient alternative distributions. The Court failed to make any form of finding or 
allocation for what portion of the retirement was earned during the marriage and what 
amount was a marital asset subject to division. The Court failed to make alternative 
compensatory awards to either equalize the parties incomes by way of an alimony award or 
to provide Delores with sufficient assets to offset the disparity in income. This is reversible 
error. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellee's brief fails to comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure and should 
be stricken. The trial court committed reversible error in failing to award Delores her 
premarital equity in the real property together with the appreciation thereof. This Court 
should adopt a formula approach to the equitable distribution of mixed marital/pre-marital 
assets. The trial court erred by failing to make adequate findings on the issue of alimony. 
The trial court erred in failing to award Delores her attorney fees in this action. The trial 
court erred in failing to divide the parties retirement accounts. Based on the foregoing, this 
Court must remand for additional findings and should reverse on the issues of alimony and 
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the division of the premarital real property and the appreciation thereof. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this^Say of March, 1999. 
STEVEN-OTYCKSEN 
Steven C. Tycksen 
Attorney for Appellant 
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The Source of Funds Rule - Equitably Classifying 
Separate and Marital Property 
by Judge Michael D, Lyon 
jMLost district court judges and family law lawyers have han-
dled a case similar to the following example: Wife has a house 
with a mortgage when the partes are married; die title stays in 
her name and the parties pay on the mortgage widi marital 
funds. How, then, at the time of the divorce is the equity or value 
in die house divided? More specifically, how is Wife's separate 
interest protected while assuring that the marital contribution to 
the value of the home is respected? The salient objective of this 
article is to share with the bar and bench the source of funds 
role, a tod which provides an equitable and systematic method 
of classifying separate and marital property.' 
1. UTAH LAW ON THE OASSmOIION OF PROPERTY 
Thcanaiv^ofapropeilydivisKmiiKidenttoad^orcebegins 
with section 30-3-5 of the Utah Code, which ostensibly givesa 
trial court broad power to equitably divide all property owned 
by the parties, regardless of when or bow it was acquired: 
"When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include 
m it equitable orders relating to die children, property, debts or 
obligations, and parties," U.CA § 30-3-5 (1997). Indeed, 
facially it creaies an ail property ^ e m ; namely, thai aB prop-
erty owned by the parties may be equitably apportioned 
between them, regardless of ownership or whenever acquired. 
Historically, the Utah Supreme Coun was reluctant to go beyond 
the broad language of the statute and provide hard and fast 
rules for property division, holding instead that a grant of broad 
discretion to die trial court would better ensure an equitable 
result. Consequently, the Utah high court found no abuse of 
discretion when premarital property; or separate gifts and 
inheritance, were liberally divided between die divorcing pzr-
Ues.SeeNeumteyerv.flewmeyert7A5?MW 
BusbeUiBusheU, 649P.2d85 (Utah 1982);Zfefto&*. 
Dubois. 504 R2d 1380 (1973). U m t e ; it affirmed trial 
courts on the odier end of the spectrum who concluded that 
each party should, in general, receive the real and personal 
property he or she brought into die marriage. See Preston v 
Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982); Georgedesv. Georgettes, 
627 P.2d 44 (Utah lW)Jesperson v.Jesperson, 610 R2d 326 
(Utah 1980); Humphreys v. Humphreys, 520 R2d 193 (Utah 
1974). 
In the past decade our appellate courts have recognized die 
value of adopting and consistently applying some general rules 
and have created an analytical framework for the treatment and 
division of separate and marital property In Mortensenv. 
Mortensenr 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988), Justice Howe articulated 
what has become the general rule in the division of separate or 
inherited property. 
[Tjrial courts making ''equitable" property division 
pursuant to section 30-3-5 should, in accordance with 
die rule prevailing in most odier jurisdictions and with 
die division made in many of our own cases, generally 
award property acquired by one spouse by gift and inher-
itance during the mamage (or property acquired in 
exchange thereof) to thai spouse, together with any 
appreciation or enhancement of its value, unless (1) die 
Judge Michael D. Lyon was appointed to 
tbe Second District Court in July 1992 by 
Governor Norman H Bangerter He 
serves as chair of the BoardofDistrict 
Judges and he recentfy sewed as presid-
ing judge of the Second District Court. 
He is a member and past president of 
RexE. Lee American Inn of Court Prior 
to bis Judicial appointment, be practiced in general litigation 
with the lawfirm oflyon, Heigesen, Waterfalls Jones in 
Ogden, Utah. Judge Lyon received bis KS. degree, cum hude, 
from Weber State College and bis JJX degree from the Univer-
sity of Utah College of Law in 1971. His is married and the 
father of six children. 
ItthJ 0 I I H I A I 
other spouse has by his or her efforts or expense con-
tributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or protection 
of that property; thereby acquiring an equitable interest to 
ft, or (2> the property has been consumed or its identity 
lost through commingling or exchanges or where the 
acquiring spouse has made a gift of an interest thereinto 
the other spouse. 
UL at 308 (citations omitted). 
Mortensen is a seminal decision because it not only provides a 
more definite statement upon which practitioners and trial 
courts can rely; it shifts the analysis in Utah from an all property 
system to a modified dualclassification system, where prop* 
erty is first categorized as either separate or marital and then, 
presumptive^ the separate property is grven to die owner 
spouse and the marital property is divided equitably. Tbe~pre-
sumptkm that separate property is given to the owner spouse 
may be rebutted, however, if there are just and equitable rea-
sons to do otherwise. Thus, the dual classification system that is 
absolute in some states is a modified system in Utah because 
equity might require the trial court to 
invade separate property in fashioning 
an equitable result 
Since Mortensen, apparently in the 
interest of promoting more predictabil-
ity and encouraging more consistent results, the Utah Court of 
Appeals has restricted a trial court* ability to divide separate 
property between the parties to a m a t o l 
naiycircumstancesr B t t ^ R i t e t 799R2d H66 (UtahApp, 
lW^CK^niniqiiecira^ 
64 (Utah App. 1991). The court of appeals has been more 
proactive in monitoring the trial court's divisions, emphasizing 
that property division should be done In a "fair; systematic 
bshton.n HaRa Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993). Specifi-
cally, the court of appeals requires detailed findings as to die 
classification of property before it is (imd&LSeeHauTTtontv 
Haumonttm?2dm (UtahApp. 1990) (remandedfor 
findings as to the source of the disputed properties); Rappkye 
v.Rappkye, 855 R2d260 (UtahApp. 1993) (similarresult); 
Burt v. Burt, 799 R2d 1166 (Utah App. 1990) (similar result). 
Thus, it is critical for trial cows and lawyers representing 
divorcing litigants to be conversant with a consistent approach 
for classifying and dividing separate property. 
"Classification of property as 
either separate or marital must 
focus on when and how the 
property was acquired." 
2. THE SOURCE Of FUNDS RULE 
A. Importance of Bqritob^ 
This current emphasis on property classification highlights a 
hole in Utah case law. Although Utah law is now fairly dear as to 
die analysis a trial court and litigants must follow once property 
has been classified, there have not been any Utah cases that 
have clearly defined bow to determine if an asset is marital or 
separate property. The source of funds rale therefore fits 
cleanly and logically into the backdrop of existing Utah law 
because it is purely a rule of classification thai provides a defini-
uon of marital property. Indeed, as discussed in more detail 
below, although Utah has not formally adopted the source of 
funds as a method of classification, many Utah cases apply 
source of funds principles. I recommend to the reader Brett R 
Turners treatise, Equitable Distribution of Property, from 
which came many of the ideas and formulas used in this article. 
Classification of property as either separate or marital must 
focus on when and how die property was acquired* The theory 
of the source of funds rule begins with the premise that prop-
erty is acquired by the parties when its 
real economic value is created For 
example, a party may hold legal tide to a 
house upon purchase, but will actually 
only "acquire" equity in the property as 
the mortgage is reduced or paid cS. 
Thus, in the opening example, although Wife holds tide to the 
house upon marriage, if the actual value of the home is create 
during the marriage through marital mortgage payments, the 
source of funds rule would define the home as marital property 
because its value was acquired during the marriage. 
The above example also i lhSnies tH%e acquisition of an 
asset may be a continuing process of making payments for die 
acquired property and, at the time of die divorce, there may be 
both a separate and a marital component in the value of the 
property. (This example is not to be confused with a situation 
where a separate asset has been commingled widi marital assets 
or has been pfied to the marital estate such that die asset has 
lost its separate classification. When a separate asset is com-
raingjed, it should be classified as marital property and divided 
between the parties. Mortensen, 760 R2d at 308.) Consider 
these further details to the above example: Wife owns a house 
with a fair market value of $ 100,000 at the time of the marriage 
and at that time the house carries an $80,000 mortgage. The 
house remains in her separate name and the parties use marital 
funds to pay down die mortgage. At the time of die divorce, the 
(stir market value is still $100,000 but the mortgage is now 
$60,000. Atrial court using the source of foods approach 
would classify (20,000 of the $40,000 of acquired value In the 
home as separate property and the remaining $20,000 as mari-
tal property 
Obviously, a practitioner or a trial judge will rarely be bced 
with dividing property that has not either appreciated or depre-
dated in value. Typically; the trial judge and the litigants are 
faced wtth the difficult proposition of classifying appreciation 
caused by forces outside the parties' control, such as inflation 
or market forces. I have found in several cases I have decided, 
that it is in these situations bat the source of funds rule and 
accompanying formulas are most hdpfaL The source of funds 
rule dictates that this kind of appreciation be given the same 
character as the underlying asset Accordingly, if the asset has 
been acquired by separate funds, all of the appreciation is . 
separate, likewise, if the asset has beat acquired with separate 
ami marital fonds, wiuch is the typical situation, the apprecia-
tion is allocated between the marital 
and separate estates proportionally. 
Brett R. Tinner, Equitable Distribution 
of Property 163 (2d ed. 1994). Giving 
appreciation the same classification as 
the asset that produced die appreciation 
is supported by a line of Utah cases. See 
Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308 (holding 
that separate property should be awarded to the owner spouse 
'together with any appreciation or enhancement of its value"); 
Dunn u Dunn, 802 R2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990) (affirming 
award to plaintiff of retirement benefits accumulated prior to 
marriage, together with ail interest attributable to those premar-
ital contributions);/Vssftm a Preston, 646P.2d705 (Utah 
1982) (remanding to the trial court for an award to defendant 
of separate property together with the proportion of apprecia-
tion in value attributable thereto). 
Although allocating appreciation proportionally may force 
members of the bar and bench from their comfort zones to 
perform mathematical exercises, 1 believe failure to award a 
litigant who has separate funds in an asset a proportionate 
share of die appreciation of the asset is not only inequitable, but 
constitutes plain crrot When a separate interest In property Is 
amply returned at the end of a marriage without any attribut-
able interest, Ae property has inequitaWy been used as an 
interest-free loan. Absent compelling equitable reasons to the 
contra* no one could argue persuasively that this approach 
should be adopted, and yet litigants routinely bypass a more 
complicated analysis by simply backing out the separate inter-
est giving it to the owner spouse, and then dividing the 
remaining property equally. 
Hie facts and outcome of Hall v. Mail 858 E2d 1018 (Utah 
App. 1993), Illustrate the inequities of this routine approach. In 
Hall, the trial court found that the wife had contributed $21,000 
into a marital home, and so it dMded the equity in die home 
equally and then took $21,000 out of the husband's marital 
share and gave it to the wife. The court of appeals held that, in 
order for an allocation of property to be done in aa fair, system-
atic fehion," die trial court should first classify proper^ » 
separate or marital, then award the wife her separate contribu-
tion (absent "extraordinary circumstances"), and then divide 
the marital equity in die home equally between the parties. 
Following these instructions, if the trial court found no extraor-
dinary circumstances on remand, the ^ 
$21,000 was returned to her without a proportionate share of 
"When a Separate interest in the Intend Her $21,000 investment in 
property is simpfy returned at 
the end of a marriage without 
any attributable interest, the 
property has inequitably been 
used as an interest-free loan." 
the home was therefore treated as an 
interest-fret loan to the marriage. Mr 
Ibrner, in commenting on the Hail case, 
points out that had the value of the 
home dropped, it would clearly have 
been improper for die court to reim-
burse petitioner for her separate 
contributions, leading die marital estate to bear die entire loss. 
MIf die separate estate must share the loss, however, it is only 
fair to allow It to share the gain. When marital and separate 
contributions are made to a single asset, the respective marital 
and separate interests should be treated as percentages and not 
as absolute amounts." Tomer, supra, S388Tapp. A. 
1 believe that given the court of appeals' preference for a sys-
tematic, fair approach, had the wife objected to die trial court's 
failure to provide more dian mere reimbursement of die sepa-
rate invesunent, the court of appeals would have approved 
awarding die wife a proportionate dare of the interest. How-
ever; since die parties did not raise the amount of 
reimbursement on appeal, die court of appeals appropriately 
did not address the issue. Clearly, then, to ensure thau spouse's 
separate property is folly and equitably restored wifli a propor-
uonate share of die interest, it is essential for practitioners and 
trial court judges to understand and conastendy apply die 
sometimes difficult source offends formulas.2 
IttbJ 0 U R I A l 
*. The Source of Funds Formula* 
As stated above, when a property's appreciation Is caused by 
forces outside the parties' control, such as inflation or market 
forces, the appreciation should be given the same classification 
as the underlying property. If, therefore, the parties have con* 
tributed to the property $10,000 in separate funds and $20,000 
in marital funds, the appreciation should be classified propor-
tionally or one-third as separate and two-thirds as maritaLIn 
Mr. Tamer's mathematical formulas, this translates as follows: 
Kt&e (or net equity) « separate contributions + marital 
contributions + appreciation 
Marital interest = value(marital contributions/total 
contributions) 
Separate interest = value(separate contributionsAotal 
contributions) 
Application of the formula is clearer through use of our exam-
ple, with additional details: M e owns a house with a fair 
market value of $100,000 at the time of die marriage and at the 
time of the marriage the house carries an $80r000 mortgage. 
The house remains in her separate name and die parties use 
marital funds to pay down the mortgage. At the time of die 
divorce, the fair market value has increased to $160,000, due to 
market forces, and the mortgage is now $40,000. The numbers 
would plug into the formulas as follows: 
Value (or net equity) « separate contributions + marital 
contributions + appreciation 
separate contributions = FMV at marriage -mortgage 
at marriage 
* $100,000 - $80f000 « $20,000 
marital contributions = Mortgage at marriage-
mortgage at divorce 
= $80,000- $40,000 m $40,000 
Value * $20,000 + $40,000 + $60,000 = $120,000 in 
net equity 
separate interest » value(sep, contribution/total 
contribution) 
separate interest = $120,000 ($20,0O0/$60,0OO) 
= $40,000 
marital interest = vaiue(mar. contribution/total 
contribution) 
marital interest = $120,000($40,00(V$601000) 
» $80,000 
Therefore, under the source of funds rule, die $120,000 of 
equity is classified $40,000 as Wt's separate interest and 
$80,000 as marital interest Wife would therefore I* entitled, 
absent extraordinary circumstances, to $80,000 inequity 
($40,000 separate interest plus one-half of the marital interest)-
She receives bade her separate contribution of $20,000 plus the 
portion of appreciation that is attributable thereto; she receives 
a return on her investment Typically, if the court determinesa 
division of properly should be consistent with this classification, 
the home is either sold or awarded to die owner spouse, who 
also assumes responsibility for die mortgage payments and 
must pay her former spouse his equity. In our example, Wife 
would receive the home, worth $160,000, assume payments on 
the $40,000 mortgage, and be forced to buyout Husband's 
$40,000 of equity. Thus, even though die is awarded the home, 
she receives no more than her share of the equity. 
The above example assumes all of the appreciation on the home 
is a result of market forces or inflation. When, however, appre-
ciation results from specific contributions of marital funds or 
efforts, die resulting appreciation assumes the character of the 
funds or efforts. Twxzsupra, at 162. This classification of 
appreciation from capital improvements is m accordance with 
Utah case law thar when a spouse has by his or her efforts and 
expense contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or 
protection of the property, he or she has acquired an equitable 
interest in i t Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308. 
To illustrate how a court could classify appreciation flat maybe 
in part due to capital improvements, assume this final variation 
of my example; W e owns a house widi a fair market value of 
$100,000 and an $80,000 mortgage at the toe of the marriage. 
The house remains in her separate name, and the parties pay 
down the mortgage using marital funds and, using $20,000 of 
marital funds, finish off die basement At the tune of the divorce, 
the fiur market value of theljpuselHSJpcreased to $160,000 
and 4 e mortgage is $40,000.1 believe that the most equitable 
approach is to add the value of the marital funds expended on 
the home, or $20,000, to the amount of marital contributions 
and the amount of total contributions, as shown below: 
Value (or net equity) • separate contributions + marital 
contributions + appreciation 
separate contributions - FMV at marriage-mortgage 
at marriage 
= $100,000 - $80,000 = $20,000 
marital contributions » [Mortgage at marriage- mort-
gage at divorce] + marital foods 
spent on capital improvements 
= ($80,000 - $40,0001 + $20,000 
= $60,000 
Value = $20,000 + $60,000 + $40,000 = $120,000 in 
net equity 
separate interest » value(sep. contribution/total 
contribution) 
separate interest* $120,000 ($20,00(y$80,000) 
= $30,000 
marital interest» value(mar. contribution/total 
contribution) 
marital interest * $120,000($60,00(V$801000) 
= $90,000 
Therefore Wife would be entitled (absent extraordinary equi-
table circumstances) to $30,000 as a separate interest in the 
home and the $90,000 marital interest would be divided equaBy 
betweendie parties.5 It should be noted that there may be times 
when evidence is presented as to the amount of appreciation 
directly resulting from the improvement When a trial court is 
presented widi this kind of evidence, it seems equitable that the 
appreciation resulting directly from the capital improvement be 
backed out of the total appreciation and classified as maritaL 
The remaining appreciation should then be apportioned 
between the separate and marital contributions using the for-
mulas and, because the appreciation due to the capital 
improvement has already been allocated, the marital funds 
spent on die capital improvement should not be included in 
cither the numerator (marital contributions) or the denomina-
tor (total contributions) of the working fractions. 
C. Evidence 
As is illustrated by Hall, appellate courts cannot rule on die 
appropriateness of allocating appreciation proportionally 
dirough d » source of funds rule without detailed findings from 
die trial court judge. Similarly a trial court cannot properly 
apply die source of hinds formulas if die litigants do not present 
detailed evidence as to the value of the property. To ensure 
Udgants do provide die necessary data, 1 use a pretrial ordet; 
specifically advising die parties dot die allocation of separate 
property seems to be at issue, and that the parties should be 
prepared to present evidence as to the following: 
1. The home's fair market value and mortgage amount at die 
time of die trial; 
2. The amount of die parties' marital contribution to the 
equity (or die amount the partes have paid on die mort-
gage during the marriage and, separately, any capital 
contributions); and 
3.Tteamoumofthepreinaritalequ^intei^indiehome/ 
3 . CONCLUSION 
DavkiS.DolowiU,mtheAp^ 
Journal, criticizes the appellate courts foe; among other things, 
being inconsistent and sometime inequitable in their treatment 
of appreciation on separate property. David S. Dolowitz, The 
Conundrum of Gifted, Inherited and Premarital Property in 
Divorce, 11 Utah fi. J. 3 at 16(1998)* His comments may well 
Indicate the growing level of frustration among members of the 
bar who arc left widwut definite, equitable guidance in this area. 
I have found the source of funds rule to be practical in its direc-
tion as to the classification of separate and marital 
equftabk in its result tyfooistagdw^ 
value of die property and when that property was acquired and 
by providing formulas tint may be consistentiy applied, its 
adoption would help dimmate some of die apparent frustration 
among members of die bench and bar by providing dear direc-
tion, thereby fostering more negotiated settlements and 
ensuring more uniform, equitable trial court decisions. Mem-
bets of die bench and bar should move beyond occasional 
application of source of funds principles to wholesale adoption 
ofthesotirceoffundsruk.Mr.lli^ 
distribution decisions defining the time at which property is 
acquired fall into two classes: those which adopt the source of 
funds rule, and tfwse which avoid the issue." Thrner, supra, a 
354, app. A. 
lfankiJadseyKGuaaf^tJi«cfcrkfo 
ttsstincc in pctpactog tfaic tfficie. 
I'Tropecy* is aordrtacd in to i ^ C&^ 
taduAa «fl property either owned by ote jpouse prior to mafifegc.arreceftedbyt 
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&te»ifl«?ft&toM*6tJl8^ 
spprcotoofl OP res! property ctpufly whew I^ UI'MI? weds woo at oVxwi pjflpet and 
ma*dfte^wedto i«s«c iadKtt^;M^ 
(afinnin* (Ifttsto* of ntoe of marital komtqpfy^ntetfhmlpm»iig$zm 
gjfito tnttbtad h backed oat). 
Tfcere stay besKBsaoM, men w when t optoji kopfottsKflf vffsoc right before n t 
divorce, when Jt is awt equfeble to Jppiy die toefttoiftioAfarjMitsapjuaBflibBs 
oMnbwwt re yeinyippitciiMOfi accord 
potm uwer JHOOCIOMK eppqmj ne lorMMB ssve •oa>«owwn;nBiP^ijfp**i 
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